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The Lowy Institute for International Policy is an independent policy think 
tank. Its mandate ranges across all the dimensions of international policy 
debate in Australia – economic, political and strategic – and it is not 
limited to a particular geographic region. Its two core tasks are to: 
• produce distinctive research and fresh policy options for Australia’s 
international policy and to contribute to the wider international debate. 
• promote discussion of Australia’s role in the world by providing an 
accessible and high quality forum for discussion of Australian 
international relations through debates, seminars, lectures, dialogues 
and conferences. 
 
Lowy Institute Analyses are short papers analysing recent international 
trends and events and their policy implications. 
The views expressed in this paper are entirely the author’s own and 
not those of the Lowy Institute for International Policy or the Australian 
Government. 
This Analysis was written as part of the Australian Customs and Border 
Protection Service Fellowship at the Lowy Institute. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The globalisation of production is transforming international trade. This 
has profound implications for government policy, particularly in the area 
of customs and border protection. Without the right policy settings at the 
border, Australian industry will struggle to compete in an international 
trading system defined by Global Value Chains. Goods and services are 
increasingly produced ‘in the world’ rather than in single countries. 
Components, investment, know-how, ideas, and people cross borders 
multiple times before a finished good is produced.  
For Australian business to compete in this environment the Australian 
Customs and Border Protection Service needs to further streamline its 
processes while still protecting Australia’s borders. One way to do this is 
through the development of an Authorised Economic Operator program 
that separates high-volume low-risk trade from high-risk transactions. 
This will require a shift from control-based to trust-based regulation.  
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The rise of global value chains (GVCs) has transformed the nature of 
international trade. International trade in the twentieth century was 
largely defined by goods made or extracted in one country and sold 
across a border into another. Today, goods and services are no longer 
produced in one country, but are ‘made in the world’, assembled from 
intermediate goods and services (and intellectual property) sourced from 
many countries.
1 
As a result, more than half of the world’s manufactured 
imports are themselves inputs — primary goods, parts, components, and 
semi-finished products.
2
 More than 70 per cent of world services imports 
are intermediate services.
3
 Trade in intermediate goods and services 
now represents more than two-thirds of global trade.
4
 
This has led to an enormous increase in trade volume, complexity, and 
risk that poses major challenges for government policy and regulation. In 
particular, without the right policy settings it is difficult for any country to 
exploit opportunities for local industries to participate in GVCs, and all 
too easy to be left behind. This is especially true for those agencies 
charged with protecting and regulating borders. Traditionally, the focus 
has been on keeping illicit goods out and regulating the transfer of licit 
commodities. Today, when most products flowing along modern supply 
chains face few transparent border barriers, there is a need to further 
streamline border processes to ensure that industry can participate in 
the new forms of international commerce. 
Greater streamlining of border processes in the interests of trade 
facilitation represents a major challenge for Australian Customs and 
Border Protection Service (Customs). Traditionally, Customs has been 
focused on regulating the border. However, as the nature of global trade 
changes, it will need to focus more on how its management of the 
Australian border can improve Australia’s trade competitiveness. By 
addressing time and cost burdens that inhibit trade, Customs can be 
central to any strategy aimed at increasing Australia’s participation in 
GVCs.  
There is no single policy or initiative that guarantees successful GVC 
participation. The profound impact GVCs have had on international 
trade, taxation, and economic policy mean a whole-of-value-chain, 
whole-of-government approach is needed. This paper argues Customs 
should help achieve this aim through the development of an Authorised 
Economic Operator (AEO) program, as one element of a paradigm shift 
from control to trust-based regulation.  
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INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 
Production has been globalised. The ‘made-here-sold-there’ premise of 
twentieth century international trade has morphed into ‘made-
everywhere-sold-everywhere’.
5
 This new reality is best reflected by the 
concept of GVCs. GVCs incorporate all production activities. As much a 
network as a chain, they encompass cross-border flows of investment, 
know-how, ideas, and people. They include the design, production, 
marketing, logistics, distribution, and support required to bring a product 
or a service from its conception to its end use.
6
 
The precursor to the GVC ‘made in the world’ phenomenon was the 
increased competition that followed decades of trade liberalisation 
policies at home and abroad. Trade policy reform drove companies to 
seek out comparative advantages and factor endowments at all stages 
of production. The rise of GVCs was then made possible by advances in 
information computer technology (ICT), and made profitable by the cost 
differences those ICT advances exploited.
7 
Now, production of goods 
and services is increasingly carried out “wherever the necessary skills 
and materials are available at competitive cost and quality.”
8 
 
Figure 1: Boeing Dreamliner 787 GVC (Source: DFAT, 2013) 
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Of course, the fragmentation of production is not new. Some may argue 
that the GVC phenomenon is little more than ordinary international trade 
on steroids. The World Trade Organization (WTO) labels this ‘nothing to 
see here’ posture as “reductionist” and one that fails to comprehend the 
speed, scale, scope, depth, and breadth of today’s global interactions.
9
 
Despite slow growth rates in much of the world international trade is 
richer, more complex, and more interconnected than ever before.
10 
 
The rationale behind trade in intermediate goods and services is not 
difficult to understand. At its simplest level, companies find it more 
efficient to source inputs from the most adept and cost-effective 
producers. Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner is an excellent example.
11
 It 
sources inputs from 22 factories across nine countries, including a 
factory in Melbourne (see Figure 1).  
Those 22 factories are also supplied by a number of input producers, 
which in turn are supplied by others further down the value chain, and so 
on. Multinational corporations such as Boeing coordinate a “significant” 
percentage (estimated to be as high as 80 per cent) of GVC trade within 
their “networks of affiliates.”
12
 The future success of Australian 
manufacturing rests on its ability to plug into such networks. For 
Australian manufacturers to compete globally, exporters require access 
to world-class intermediate goods and services — many of which are 
imported. Evidence shows that the capacity to import efficient inputs 
increasingly determines the export competitiveness of a country’s 
products.
13 
This makes the old mercantilist approach to trade and border 
administration of ‘imports bad, exports good’ completely 
counterproductive to economic growth and competitiveness. 
Traditional methods for measuring trade are yet to catch up with new 
realities. In a trade environment defined by intermediate goods crossing 
borders multiple times, gross trade statistics do not accurately reflect 
where value comes from. Instead, the value of a product is attributed to 
the final country in the value chain. As former WTO director-general 
Pascal Lamy has explained: “the statistical bias created by attributing 
commercial value to the last country of origin perverts the true economic 
dimension of bilateral trade imbalances — this affects the political debate 
and leads to misguided perceptions.”
14
 The now ubiquitous iPhone 
value chain (in Figure 2 below) provides a case in point.
15 
Gross trade statistics attribute all $US194.04 of the iPhone’s imported 
value to China, when China’s value-added actually accounts for only 
$US6.54. Most of the iPhone’s value derives from Korean, German, and 
American inputs. In this example, America is actually importing more of 
its own inputs than Chinese or German inputs — or approximately 12.5 
per cent of the iPhone’s imported value.  
 
…the old mercantilist 
approach to trade and 
border administration of 
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Figure 2: Apple iPhone 3 GVC (Source: OECD, 2011) 
 
 
The fact that many Chinese exports to the United States contain such 
little Chinese value drastically reduces China’s real trade surplus with the 
United States. In addition, while many of China’s exports may end their 
journey in America, or Europe, or Japan, they contain value derived from 
inputs sourced from any number of countries, which, in turn, perverts the 
trade balances of source countries as well. The fact that this scenario 
plays out across the world all the time, involving any number of trade 
routes and value chains leads to the misguided perceptions, debate, and 
analysis to which Pascal Lamy referred.  
As a result, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and the WTO recently developed estimates of 
trade flows in value-added.
16
 By these measures Australia has the 
second-highest rate of domestic value-added content of exports among 
OECD economies.
17
 This is positive, however approximately 40 per cent 
of Australia’s domestic value-added exports derives from ‘mining 
activities’, which obscures just how much other industries rely on 
imported value to remain competitive.   
A recognition of the importance of trade in value-added must inform 
Australia’s trade policy. Australia will never win a race to the bottom on 
price and we should not seek to do so. Rather, the key to Australia’s 
future prosperity is to gain a permanent seat at the high value-added 
head of the GVC table. To that end, the impact GVCs have on the 
service economy is a primary consideration. 
Australia will never win a 
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Services are a part of almost every economic activity.
18 
A range of 
‘producer services’, such as design, transport, logistics, communication, 
finance, legal, accounting, insurance, and other miscellaneous business 
services are needed to sustain GVCs. Services play a far more 
significant role in GVCs than previously thought, as it is the service 
inputs in the majority of GVCs where most value is added. 
Consequently, efficient and competitive services inputs have become as 
important to a country’s export competitiveness and GVC participation 
as efficient manufactured inputs.
19
 
In Australia, approximately 40 per cent of exports measured in value-
added originates from services — more than double the representation 
of services in gross trade statistics.
20 
However, this number is still below 
the OECD average of 48 per cent, despite Australia performing well in 
the OECD Trade Restrictiveness Index.
21
 In New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States not only are percentages of value-
added service exports considerably greater, but they have all increased 
(in some cases dramatically) since 1995. In contrast, Australia’s 
percentage of value-added services exports has actually fallen.
22 
This is 
partly because Australian resource exports have experienced sustained 
growth, while services exports (much like manufacturing and agriculture 
exports) have remained flat due to the appreciation of the Australian 
dollar over this period.
23
 
Figure 3: OECD — Australia’s percentage of value-added services exports (Source: OECD, WTO 2013) 
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It is estimated that continued liberalisation of services could result in an 
additional $21 billion in Australian services exports, and an extra 
100,000 Australian jobs.
24 
Considering Australia’s highly sophisticated 
service economy, there are clearly still opportunities for greater GVC 
participation. However, the window of opportunity for Australian service 
providers to entrench themselves in GVCs throughout Asia’s high-
growth economies and beyond will not remain open forever. As Asian 
service providers increase their local capacity, and competition from 
other developed economies intensifies, Australia should do all it can to 
engender greater services GVC participation now, or face even greater 
challenges in the future. 
Figure 4: OECD — Percentage of Gross Exports GVC Participation 1995 and 2009 (Source: OECD) 
 
 
*The index represented in Figure 4 is calculated as a percentage of 
gross exports and has two components: the import content of exports 
and the exports of intermediate inputs (goods and services) used in third 
countries’ exports.
25
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SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES 
Participation in GVCs leads to increased investment, productivity, 
economic growth, income, and employment — the greater the 
participation level, the greater the growth rate.
26
 While outsourcing and 
offshoring are often seen in the public debate as synonymous with job 
losses, evidence shows that in the longer-term, as economic 
adjustments are made, a positive relationship between imports and 
employment develops.
27 
Currently, one in five Australian jobs is related 
to international trade.
28 
Trade not only creates jobs — it creates good 
jobs. Australians employed in export industries are more likely to be 
employed on a full-time basis and earn, on average, 60 per cent more 
than those employed in non-export industries.
29 
As industry participation 
in GVCs increases, jobs will continue to be created through higher 
productivity and the attendant expansion of economic activity.  
However, Australia’s successful GVC participation is not guaranteed. 
Evidence suggests that Australia’s trade performance has been idle for 
too long and competitors have leap-frogged our performance 
standards.
30
 Australia’s natural disadvantages, including its distance 
from major global markets and the so-called ‘headquarter’ economies of 
Japan, Germany, and the United States, only serve to compound the 
challenge. As a result, it is critical that government policy levers are set 
to enable GVC participation. Otherwise Australia will fall behind as its 
exports struggle to compete against those from countries whose 
industries enjoy world-class price-quality ratios thanks to their own GVC 
participation.  
Lean inventories and nimble exploitation of ‘just-in-time’ production 
opportunities are the keys to effective participation in GVCs. To achieve 
these efficiencies, producers must rely on coordinated movements of 
goods and services across a number of countries.
31 
Government can 
help business to meet these challenges, under the broad rubric of “trade 
facilitation.”
32
 
Trade facilitation is often divided into ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ categories. Hard 
trade facilitation involves improvements to infrastructure, such as 
expanding ports or building new roads. Policies and procedures for 
customs and border administration are categorised as soft trade 
facilitation.
33 
While it is generally believed that gains from hard trade 
facilitation reforms are greater, they are also much more expensive to 
pursue.
34
 In terms of trade cost reductions per unit of expenditure, 
reforms to customs and border administration and other soft measures 
are the ‘low-hanging fruit’ of trade facilitation, offering the greatest gains 
for the least cost.
35 
 
Trade facilitation is receiving increased attention internationally because 
of the widespread economic benefits it creates. Recent studies by 
international organisations, including the OECD, WTO, World Economic 
Australia’s trade 
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Forum and APEC, have found that trade facilitation reform can result in 
hundreds of billions of dollars in gains to the regional and global 
economy.
36 
A 2013 World Economic Forum report estimates that global 
GDP would increase by 5 per cent if every country’s average border 
administration and transport and communications infrastructure were 
improved only halfway to world’s best practice. The same report found 
that these improvements would have an impact on global GDP six times 
greater than the removal of all remaining import duties.
37
 
The WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation, concluded in December 
2013, was set to harness the growing international momentum for 
reform. Unfortunately, the prescribed 31 July 2014 deadline to adopt the 
necessary Protocol of Amendment was not met by WTO members. 
Despite this setback to multilateral comprehensive trade facilitation 
reform, the anticipated economic gains flowing from the Agreement are 
still within reach. Australia must now proactively pursue domestic trade 
facilitation reform to foster greater opportunity for GVC participation and 
help the Australian economy to reap the benefits of increased 
international competitiveness, income, and jobs.  
AN OPPORTUNITY AND A CHALLENGE FOR 
CUSTOMS 
The rise of GVCs poses major administrative and regulatory challenges 
for Customs. It is projected that by 2017 air cargo and sea cargo volume 
will rise by 85 per cent and 20 per cent respectively.
38 
Compounding this 
challenge further is an increase in final product demand due to the 
emergence of Asia and high growth rates in new economies. This has 
implications for both Australia’s trade performance and border 
protection.  
Trade facilitation and border protection may appear to be mutually 
exclusive. The idea that a country can have open borders facilitating an 
open economy without inherently weakening its border protection seems 
counter-intuitive. However, the vast majority of trade and travel is entirely 
legitimate. The portion that is not legitimate is where Customs can most 
fruitfully focus its attention. But how? There are two ways to find a 
needle in a haystack: examine every straw, or shrink the haystack to a 
manageable size. By differentiating between high- and low-risk cargo, 
Customs can expedite clearance of low-risk cargo and allocate scarce 
resources to that which it deems to be high-risk. Given the sheer volume 
of trade, expediting the movement of regular low-risk cargo is “essential 
to the security function itself.”
39 
Trade facilitation and border protection 
are not “antithetical” but “part and parcel of a single process.”
40
  
The question then becomes how best can the twin goals of trade 
facilitation and border protection be achieved? One way is through the 
establishment of an Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) program. At 
its core, an AEO program is a partnership between government and 
…how best can the twin 
goals of trade facilitation 
and border protection be 
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industry within which private entities enjoy tangible trade facilitation 
benefits and, in return, provide information and assurances about the 
security of their supply chain. While the scale and scope of AEO 
programs may vary, they shift the regulatory focus from the border 
transaction itself to the entities and systems behind the transaction. They 
reduce transaction costs at the border for traders, and allow Customs to 
focus its resources on higher-risk movements of goods and people 
across the border. 
Customs is currently engaged with industry in the co-design of an AEO 
program known as Trusted Trader. It is intended to be open to exporters 
and importers (who are increasingly the same entities), as well as other 
supply chain participants. To become a Trusted Trader a business would 
need to undergo a risk assessment that considers the entity, the goods 
being traded, and its supply chain.  
However, the authorisation process should not (wherever possible) add 
yet another layer of regulation, but instead leverage the existing 
information and systems of partner agencies and departments (and the 
entity itself), such as the Office of Transport Security and the Department 
of Agriculture.
41
 This would not only mitigate the confusing trade-
inhibiting effect of multiple regulations, but also minimise accreditation 
expenses for those entities already certified in other supply chain 
security schemes.  
Further, there is room for flexibility. A tiered approach to authorisation 
depending on risk assessments, compliance records, or entity size could 
apply. Moreover, for traders who see no advantage in authorisation, or 
do not meet minimum requirements, traditional control-based regulation 
could remain in place. 
Figure 5: Trusted Trader Status (Source: N Humphries) 
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An AEO accreditation could confer significant commercial advantages 
through trade facilitation benefits and branding opportunities. Further, as 
more operators become authorised, the more valuable authorisation 
becomes and the greater the cost (both commercial and reputational) if 
authorisation is revoked. To this end, Customs should promote its AEO 
program as widely as possible. 
For an AEO program to work, government and will need to share 
responsibilities with the private sector. If Customs is to facilitate trade, 
then Trusted Traders need to become part of Australia’s border 
protection network. Only then can a dynamic of partnership and shared 
responsibility move beyond rhetoric. Trusted Traders will need to secure 
their business and supply chains to help protect the Australian 
community from weapons, drugs, and biosecurity threats. Typically, this 
would include securing physical premises and IT systems, and 
performing background checks on employees. Should trust be breached, 
expulsion from the scheme would follow.  
An AEO program can only succeed if operators recognise that the loss 
of trust and potential damage to their reputations far outweighs any 
gains they may derive from cheating the system.
42
 By leveraging trust 
and reputation, Customs can develop an AEO program that minimises 
systemic risks such as moral hazard and adverse selection whereby an 
entity exploits its authorisation for an unfair commercial advantage or 
seeks accreditation with nefarious intent; as well as other opportunistic 
or criminal behaviours.
43 
 
While an AEO program is fundamentally an exercise in supply chain 
security, it could also be used as a tool to manage, for example, 
environmental and labour standards both domestically and 
internationally. In this context ‘supply chain security’ could be expanded 
to mitigate the risk of dangerous or problematic corner-cutting. 
Promoting good behaviour in the long term would raise standards across 
GVCs beyond supply chain security. 
HOW DOES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AEO 
PROGRAM AID AUSTRALIA’S GVC PARTICIPATION? 
Currently, the lack of an Australian AEO program means that Australian 
companies face higher import transaction costs than do companies in 
countries with AEO programs that have attached import benefits. 
Further, Australian companies have no way to demonstrate to their 
export markets that their supply chain security practices meet 
international AEO equivalent standards — standards that are 
increasingly “front and center as determinants of competitiveness.”
44 
As 
a result, Australian companies are more likely to face delays at market 
ports, affecting the cost, timing, and reliability of Australian exports. 
Accordingly, foreign multinational companies concerned with reliability 
and costs — as well as their own supply chain security and AEO 
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equivalent status — are less likely to include Australian companies in 
their GVCs. This places Australian industry at a clear competitive 
disadvantage. After all, Australia’s top ten import source countries, nine 
of its top ten export markets, and all but one of its bilateral Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) partners have established AEO programs.
45
 
There is no time to waste in the establishment of an Australian AEO 
program, however to ensure its efficacy it must be widely embraced by 
Australian industry. The attached benefits must be “meaningful, 
measurable, and reportable.”
46
 To that end, a key feature of an AEO 
would be to make it easier and cheaper for Australian companies to 
import. This is critical to their ability to participate in GVCs because 
efficient access to imports increasingly determines the competitiveness 
of their exports.
47 
 
Potential import benefits from Australia’s Trusted Trader program include 
reduced fees and charges, priority processing of trade advices and duty 
concession applications, simplified reporting and refund of duty 
procedures, ‘head of the queue’ treatment for inspection, and expedited 
cargo release. All these elements would reduce the trade costs for 
Trusted Traders. For example, following the introduction of an AEO 
program in Japan, clearance times for authorised cargo dropped by 60 
per cent
48 
and import permit processing times fell from 3.1 hours to 6 
minutes.
49 
However, perhaps the most meaningful potential benefit for 
AEOs is deferred payment of duty, providing a massive cash flow benefit 
to trusted importers that would resonate broadly.  
An AEO program also offers an opportunity to aggregate government 
services in a whole-of-value-chain approach aimed at increasing GVC 
participation. Government services could then be tailored to traders 
accordingly. For example, the aggregating impact of an AEO program 
could be harnessed to help small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
expand their international trade footprint, and assist businesses of all 
sizes to maximise their international trade opportunities. This 
aggregation of services would also provide an environment for better 
collaboration within government itself by encouraging departments to 
ensure that their “interests are aligned, skill gaps closed, and structural 
constraints addressed.”
50
 In particular, it might prompt border agencies 
to integrate with international ‘single window’ networks, and to 
acknowledge the human element of GVCs by extending trust-type 
benefits to travelers also.
51
   
The enhanced collaboration between government and industry following 
the development of an AEO program would provide a good environment 
for streamlining regulatory standards. The potential rewards of greater 
regulatory harmony were glimpsed earlier this year when a small food 
co-operative in northern New South Wales struck a commercial deal with 
Chinese regulators to carry out testing, quarantine and quality assurance 
…an AEO program 
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protocols in Australia and China simultaneously. The end result was 
Australia’s first-ever fresh milk export to China.
52
   
One potential criticism of an AEO program is that it would create an 
uneven playing field in favour of large corporations. SMEs have a lesser 
capacity to establish the supply chain security necessary to participate in 
AEO programs. To avoid this disadvantage, SMEs — of a certain size or 
with a certain trading footprint — could access benefits by using the 
services of authorised supply chain participants (including freight 
forwarders and customs brokers).
53 
That said, the most typical path for 
SME entry into GVCs is to sell their goods and services to larger 
multinational firms that coordinate the vast majority of GVCs.
54 
As a 
result, while SMEs may not participate directly in GVCs to the extent 
larger firms do, they still benefit greatly through indirect exporting — 
meaning that their products may be sold domestically to larger firms 
which then incorporate their value into GVCs.
55
 For example, in the 
United States, SMEs have created as much as 41 per cent of US value-
added exports, despite only being responsible for approximately 28 per 
cent of gross trade, due to indirect exporting. 
THE NEW ZEALAND EXAMPLE 
To understand the potential benefits of establishing an AEO program, 
Australia need only look at the example of New Zealand’s Secure 
Exports Scheme.
56 
New Zealand is home to more than 120 authorised 
exporters. In 2013, almost a third of all New Zealand exports originated 
from AEOs.
57 
Despite the fact that Australia has an FTA with the United 
States, New Zealand exporters (with no such agreement) are three and 
a half times less likely to see their cargo held up for examination on 
arrival at a United States port.
58
 Authorised New Zealand cargo is 
deemed ‘low-risk’ by the United States. Australian exporters are left 
looking like Australian travelers waiting in line at Heathrow Airport, 
waving passports with Her Majesty’s request that that they be offered 
every assistance, while EU passport holders walk straight through. 
One element of New Zealand’s success has been the conclusion of 
AEO Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) with the United States, 
Korea, and Japan. Mutual Recognition allows two or more customs 
administrations to “recognise each other’s audits, controls and 
authorisations as equivalent and therefore provide reciprocal benefits to 
AEOs.”
59
 In practice, this removes much of the Customs regulatory 
burden for exporters at foreign markets. Pursuing bilateral MRAs 
between countries with established AEO programs is a growing trend 
internationally but will do little to plug Australia into GVCs in and of itself.  
Rather, Australia should look to pursue a large regional MRA as a part of 
one of the mega-regional trade agreements currently being negotiated 
— the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) or the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). RCEP is an ASEAN-
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centred proposal for a regional free trade area, which would initially 
include the ten ASEAN member states and those countries that have 
existing FTAs with ASEAN such as Australia, China, India, and Japan. It 
would offer a regional forum for pursuing an MRA agenda. Its 16 nations 
include economies at every stage of GVC participation. In addition, 
RCEP nations already account for 60 per cent of Australia’s two-way 
trade, and 70 per cent of Australia’s goods and services exports.
60
  
While pursuing a large regional MRA would be ambitious, it would do 
more to entrench Australia’s GVC participation than a piecemeal 
country-by-country approach. It would also provide a tangible business 
outcome to the RCEP negotiations, and reduce the risk of multiple 
MRAs of differing scopes that create trade confusion rather than trade 
facilitation.
61
 Furthermore, pursuing a regional MRA agenda and a 
targeted bilateral strategy focused on headquarter economies is not a 
zero-sum game. However, it is vital that the positive agenda of AEO 
regional mutual recognition does not become contingent on the success 
of other regional (or global) trade facilitation reforms. An AEO regional 
mutual recognition network should be pursued on its own merits.  
CONCLUSION 
Successful participation in GVCs will involve more than trade facilitation 
reform. Also fundamental are the continued unilateral and multilateral 
liberalisation of tariff and non-tariff barriers (including in services and 
foreign direct investment) along with the right national policies for 
promoting skills development, education, innovation, and the creation of 
strategic infrastructure. The multidimensional nature of GVCs means 
that gains made on one front can all too quickly be negated by inertia on 
another. Ultimately, it will take a whole-of-government approach to 
ensure that Australia can realise the opportunities of a changing global 
trading system. 
Nevertheless, better trade facilitation is a key step in improving 
Australia’s export performance and mitigating the disadvantages of a 
high-cost economy, distance from economic and knowledge centres, 
and a persistently strong dollar. A small but integral part of this strategy 
is soft trade facilitation reform at the border to streamline trade and 
reduce the cost of conducting business internationally. Customs can be 
central to this strategy through the development of an AEO program. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: RCEP participating 
countries (Source: DFAT) 
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